We apply a normalization of deviance model to understand the prevalence of the illegal practice of wage arrears, the delayed payment of wages, in Russia during the 1990s. The normalization literature proposes that organizational deviance may be self-reinforcing, such that initial acts of organizational deviance may induce additional deviations from formal standards of appropriate behavior. Based on this perspective, we hypothesize that the frequent adoption of a deviant practice within a community will make it more likely that firms in that community will engage in deviance and less likely that injured stakeholders will actively mobilize to oppose it. Our empirical analysis of wage arrears in Russia, based on panel data from a large, nationally representative sample of Russian agricultural and industrial enterprises, supports our hypotheses.
Quid leges sine moribus vanae proficient (Of what use are laws empty of customs?)
-Odes of Horace, 3.24 A growing stream of research in the management literature has examined deviant organizational behavior as a property of the institutional context in which it takes place. By a deviant organizational behavior, we refer to "an event, activity or circumstance, occurring in and/or produced by a formal organization, that deviates from both formal design goals and normative standards or expectations, either in the fact of its occurrence or in its consequences" (Vaughan, 1999: 273) . Organizational deviance is sometimes explained by the breakdown of a normally well-functioning institutional system, such that organizational mistakes and misconduct are seen as rare events limited to marginal and failing organizations. In contrast, an institutional perspective views organizational deviance as "a routine by-product of the characteristics of the system itself" (Vaughan, 1999: 274) . Once a community normalizes a deviant organizational practice, it becomes a routine activity that is commonly anticipated and frequently used (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Brief, Buttram, & Dukerich, 2001; Ermann & Lundman, 2002; Palmer, 2008; Pinto, Leana & Pil, 2008; Vaughan, 1996) .
While organizational research has usually analyzed normalization processes at the level of the individual firm, Misangyi, Weaver, and Elms (2008) call for an extension of this perspective to higher levels of analysis. They note that recent scandals in the United States have been "industry wide (e.g., accounting, energy, insurance, mutual funds) or regional (e.g., California's energy crisis) and not merely a matter of misbehavior by a specific organization, group or individual" (Misangyi et al., 2008: 750) . To extend analysis of the institutional context of deviant organizational behavior, they propose that "amoral (and corrupt) reasoning, and the responses to it, need to be construed as part of a larger institutional logic within which individuals, organizations, and even researchers are embedded."
In this paper, we address this call to extend the normalization model to higher levels of analysis. At the level of a single organization, the normalization literature has shown that deviance may develop along a "slippery slope where initial, idiosyncratic corrupt practices become institutionalized over time" (Ashforth & Anand, 2003: 4) . We apply a similar logic to the study of a community of organizational actors. If deviant behavior is allowed to persist unchecked within a community, we propose that it is likely to become increasingly entrenched and difficult to reverse over time.
To develop hypotheses about the self-reinforcing properties of normalization processes, we build upon related research that has analyzed institutional processes in the spread of organizational practices within a common field of actors (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Fligstein, 1985) . While this research has usually focused on legitimate organizational practices -practices that conform to the broader regulatory and normative standards of broader society -we suggest a similar institutional perspective can be applied to the study of deviant organizational practices. A common finding in the organization literature is that the cumulative use of an organizational practice within a field positively influences the subsequent growth and survival of the practice (Burns & Wholey, 1993; Davis, 1991; Guler, Guillen, & Macpherson, 2002; Palmer, Jennings, & Zhou, 1993; Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997) . Based on a similar logic, we propose in this paper that the widespread use of a deviant practice within a community will positively influence the choices of individual firms within that community to engage in deviant behavior.
In our analysis of deviant practices, we not only build upon existing organizational research but also contribute to it. Numerous organizational theorists have called for the inclusion of audiences and interests beyond those of managers when examining the ways that institutional processes shape organizational behavior (Clemens & Cook, 1999; Hinings & Greenwood, 2002; Seo & Creed, 2002; Stryker, 2000; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996) . We address these concerns by including an examination of stakeholder opposition to deviant practices in our analysis. In particular, we examine the case of labor-related deviance where workers suffer harm from an organizational practice that violates the formal rules of society. We propose that workers are less likely to quit or strike against individual firms that engage in deviant behavior if they work in communities where the deviant practice has already become normalized through frequent use.
We test our hypotheses through an analysis of managerial and worker responses to the growth of wage arrears in Russia in the1990s. Wage arrears, the late and non-payment of contractual wages to employees, first became substantial in Russia in 1993, and the aggregate stock of overdue wages grew to a total of 50 trillion rubles (around 8 billion dollars U.S.) by the beginning of 1998 (Goskomstat, 1998) . Nearly two-thirds of Russian employees reported they were owed overdue wages by the end of that year, with an average debt of 4.8 monthly wages per affected worker (Earle & Sabirianova, 2000) . The growth of wage arrears took place despite the fact that they were illegal and had adverse effects on workers. Indeed, while the legal systems of most other countries provide no special provisions for wage arrears, treating them merely as a particular case of contract violations, the Russian Labor Code explicitly outlawed them.
Moreover, Russian workers that received wage arrears were also more likely to have health problems and a lower standard of living than those that received consistent, contractual wages (Gerber 2006) . Public opinion data show that Russian workers consistently identified wage arrears as one of the most fundamental problems facing the country during the 1990s (Javeline, 2003) .
Our analysis of a large survey of Russian agricultural and industrial firms, containing annual information from 1991 to 1998, provides strong support for our normalization hypotheses in the context of wage arrears in Russia. Our findings show robust community effects both in firm use of wage arrears, controlling for multiple measures of firm performance and liquidity as well as for firm fixed effects, and in workers' mobilization against them, through workers' quit (exit) and strike (voice) behavior.
THE NORMALIZATION OF DEVIANT ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICES
The normalization literature distinguishes between factors that lead to the genesis of organizational deviance and factors that cause deviance to become routine, rather than idiosyncratic, behavior. A permissive ethical climate, an emphasis on financial goals at all costs, and an opportunity to act amorally or immorally, all contribute to managerial decisions to initiate deviance (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Brief, Buttram, & Dukerich, 2001 ). If deviance is allowed to continue unchecked, then individual acts of deviance can turn over time into "institutionalized corruption: personal behaviors become impersonal norms, emergent practices become tacit understandings and idiosyncratic acts become shared procedures" (Ashforth & Anand, 2003: 9) . Ashforth and Anand (2003) posit three stages of normalization: institutionalization, rationalization and socialization. Institutionalization refers to the process by which initial deviant acts become embedded in organizational structures and processes; rationalization to the process by which new ideologies develop to justify and perhaps even valorize deviance; and socialization to the process by which deviance becomes accepted as permissible if not desirable. Through these reinforcing and overlapping mechanisms, the formal rules and normative prescriptions operable in broader society comes to fade into the background of everyday organizational practice. While the initiation of deviance may be the result of individual action, its subsequent proliferation and persistence is best explained through incremental and collective processes that lead deviance to become part of an organization's culture and policies. Misangyi et al. (2008) propose that communities as well as organizations may develop institutional beliefs and structures that normalize deviance over time. They apply this insight to the study of anti-corruption campaigns, suggesting that many reform programs do not succeed because they inadequately address the normalization dynamics that embed corruption within local culture and politics. As corruption spreads and intensifies within a community, deviance from formal laws and standards often becomes a routine and anticipated part of economic life. For instance, organizational researchers have demonstrated that graft and bribes may become an "established way of life" in some industries and communities (Needleman & Needleman, 1977: 123; see also Geis, 1967; Waters, 1978) . Since the operable norms of behavior in these communities no longer match those prescribed in law, reform efforts need to move beyond changes in formal regulations if they wish to initiate meaningful change. Instead, Misangyi et al. (2008) propose that anti-corruption campaigns are most likely to succeed when they explicitly address the informal beliefs, understandings and relationships that entrench deviant behavior within community-wide norms of organizational behavior. Misangyi et al.'s (2008) discussion of anti-corruption campaigns identifies the need to study the behavior of those that oppose deviance as well as those that benefit from it. Ermann and Lundman (2002) make a related argument when they propose that "stakeholder reactions" should be included in any model of organizational misconduct: "institutionalized deviance typically continues until stopped from inside or outside the organization. Internally, whistle blowers may step forward with accusations and evidence of wrongdoing. Externally, the media, prosecutors, or victims may challenge organizational actions." (Ermann & Lundman, 2002: 27) . Palmer (2008) similarly argues that the actions of numerous "social control agents" need to be included in the study of organizational wrong-doing. The identification of potential challengers to deviant organization behavior, such as journalists, regulators, anti-corruption crusaders, whistle-blowers or workers, demonstrates the need to include multiple audiences in examining the factors that explain the growth and persistence of organizational deviance within a community.
In the following section, we analyze separately the effects of normalization on the decisions of managers to engage in deviant behavior and on the decision of potential challengers to oppose it. We do not analyze the reasons that deviance becomes initially adopted within a community, but instead focus on the effects of normalization processes on organizational and stakeholder behavior in situations where deviance has already become wide-spread. We propose that as normalization processes widen the scope of managerial options to pursue profits through new deviant practices, they are also likely to limit the options open to others to challenge this behavior.
The Use of Deviant Organizational Practices
An important implication of the normalization model is that the initial use of a deviant organizational practice may contribute to its own reproduction through its effect on managerial cognition and reasoning. Pinto et al. (2008) discuss the role of sensemaking and routinization in explaining the cognitive mechanisms that lead to the normalization of corruption within an organization. Sensemaking occurs when members confront events, issues and actions that are somehow surprising or confusing (Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Louis, 1980) . When managers first encounter deviant behavior, for instance, the need to make sense of the new practice leads them to carefully observe the actions of others to uncover the operating norms of behavior within the organization and the broader society. As initial uncertainty fades and a practice becomes routinized, however, this active consideration of external norms and internal morality tends to decrease. Pinto et al. (2008: 695) build on Tenbrunsel and Messick's (2004) work on the "slippery slope" of ethical decision-making to identify why the ethical aspects of managerial decisionmaking may fade into the background through routinization. Psychological numbing takes place as members of a community become repeatedly exposed to deviant behavior; over time, "repeated exposures to ethical dilemmas may produce a form of ethical numbing in which selfreproof is diminished" (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004: 228) . A process of induction also contributes to the incremental entrenchment of deviant behavior over time. Using inductive logic, managers are likely to rely on past organizational decisions as a guide to evaluate the ethicality of new forms of behavior. The past success of deviant practices is assumed to validate the process through which initial deviant decisions were made (see also Ashforth & Anand, 2003: 9) . The frequent use of a deviant practice therefore provides an ethical precedent that encourages its future use without a continuous reexamination of its acceptability: "Routinization means that when a practice has become routine, it is ordinary, mundane, and acceptable. Any ethical coloration is lost." (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004: 228) .
The discussion of the amplifying effects of deviance through its routine use relates to similar arguments made about the spread of legitimate organizational practices across organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Fligstein, 1985; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983) . In the literature on organizational fields in the management literature, normative standards of behavior are not simply imposed on managers by more powerful organizations such as the state or professional organizations. Instead, managers themselves are participants in the construction of the commonly accepted standards of behavior under which they operate. A process of social learning and observation moves an organizational practice from an innovation that requires active efforts of sensemaking to a routine behavior that operates as a habitual response to common organizational problems. The more that a practice becomes frequently performed within a field, then the more likely that other managers in the field will come to use the practice over time. A firm's adoption of a new activity therefore has consequences not only for the firm itself, but also for the community as a whole.
Organizational researchers have frequently used a measure of a practice's cumulative adoption within an organizational field to study institutional effects in the spread of a new organizational practice (Burns & Wholey, 1993; Davis, 1991; Guler, Guillen, & Macpherson, 2002; Palmer, Jennings, & Zhou, 1993; Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997) . These authors argue that the wide-spread use of an organizational practice communicates to members of a social system the operable norms of appropriate behavior in ways that an examination of formal law or expressed moral sentiment cannot. We suggest that a similar logic can be applied to the study of deviant organizational practices. The wide-spread use of a practice may communicate that an organizational practice has lost any special regulatory or moral status within a community (i.e., it is normalized) as much as it may communicate that a practice has come to take on new positive, social meanings (i.e., it is legitimized). We propose that the cumulative and successful use of a deviant organizational practice is likely to reinforce perceptions of its normalization among managers who work within the same community, which, in turn, will contribute to its continued use. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
Reactions to Deviant Organizational Practices
An important question in the persistence of deviant organizational practices is not only why managers choose to use them, but also why other stakeholders permit managers to shape the workplace as they choose (Ermann & Lundman, 2002) . To address this question, we propose in this section that the normalization of a deviant organizational practice will decrease the likelihood that opponents and victims will believe that they are able to successfully challenge deviant behavior. The influence of institutionalization processes on the degree of opposition to a new practice is often theorized in the organizational literature. Jepperson (1991: 145) suggests that institutionalized practices "owe their survival to relatively self-activating social processes.
Their persistence is not dependent notably, upon recurrent collective mobilization.... " Clemens and Cook (1999: 445) write that institutionalized procedures pattern the actions of individuals and organization "without requiring repeated collective mobilization or authoritative intervention to achieve these regularities." Tolbert and Zucker (1996) similarly suggest that "relatively low resistance by opposing groups" is an important indicator of the degree of institutionalization of an organizational practice. We make a related argument about normalization processes. We suggest that the more a deviant behavior becomes normalized, then the lower the resistance by opposing groups. Misangyi et al. (2008) identify multiple mechanisms by which normalization processes within a community are likely to decrease stakeholder opposition to deviant behavior. They first note that "conditions that trigger deliberative cognition about behavior make institutional change more likely, as such deliberation renders often taken-for-granted institutional logics visible and thus open to question or challenge (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Seo & Creed, 2002) ." (Misangyi et. al, 2008: 756) . From this perspective, the routinization processes previously identified as accelerating managerial use of a deviant practices are also likely to curtail stakeholders from openly questioning or challenging this behavior. As a deviant practice becomes increasingly normalized, active deliberation and conversation about its appropriateness are likely to diminish. Misangyi et al. (2008) further posit that normalization processes entrench deviant behavior within a community through the redistribution of resources in favor of the status quo.
As a deviant practice spreads across a community, those who benefit from this activity gather additional resources to reward those who conform to local norms of deviant behavior and to punish those who oppose them. The growing power of those who engage in deviant behavior comes not only from the accumulation of financial wealth, which is likely to increase if deviant behavior precedes unpunished, but also from the ability to use new resources to ensure continuing sources of human capital (e.g. access to education and expertise) and social capital (e.g. access to leaders who regulate markets and society). The power of those that support deviance systems comes not only from their direct access to cash, but also from their ability to shape institutional rules and rewards in their own favor (Clemens & Cook, 1999; Seo & Creed, 2002) . Misangyi et al.'s (2008) proposal that cognitive and resource effects act in tandem to sustain deviant behavior within communities is similar to Ashforth and Anand's (2003: 38) argument that deviance is "normalized when the group's structure, processes and employee mental models act together to perpetuate unethical acts." The normalization literature does not isolate a single mechanism in explaining normalization effects, but instead notes the overlapping and self-reinforcing effects of multiple processes in explaining why normalization makes deviance more difficult to challenge or reverse over time.
Worker mobilization against violations of formal labor standards and rights provides an important example of the tight interconnection between symbol and substance in the persistence of deviant organizational behavior. A long literature has demonstrated that organizations frequently implement policies that curtail human rights, offer below minimum wages or provide inadequate health and safety working conditions (Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Rosen, 2002) .
Moreover, research into worker movements illustrates that workers are not always passive recipients of managerial choices, but at times mobilize to transform the institutional environment in which they work (Edwards, 1979; Hirschman, 1970; Piven & Cloward, 1978) . Comparative management researchers have also demonstrated that political conflict and settlements between workers and managers have been an important factor in explaining cross-national variation in corporate governance systems (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Roe, 2006 ). An important question in the study of labor-related deviance therefore relates to the potential mobilization of workers to contest boundaries of appropriate organizational behavior.
In examining when worker mobilization is most likely to take place, Piven and Cloward (1978) remark that "the social arrangements that are perceived as just and immutable must come to seem both unjust and mutable" before workers organize to oppose managerial action. From this perspective, a worker's propensity to mobilize against a deviant practice is likely to decrease as routinization processes change what is considered to be "just" organizational behavior within a community. Just as importantly, the continued use of a deviant practice within a community may also transform beliefs about the relative permanence of a practice, i.e., what is "mutable." Workers may personally disapprove of a practice but nonetheless consider themselves powerless to change it. As deviance spreads and intensifies, workers are therefore likely to define their immediate interests as surviving within existing institutional arrangements rather than mobilizing to challenge the broader system in which they work.
Organizational researchers have often noted that strategic actors respond to institutional norms in the broader environment not only because they value or agree with them, but also because they become "experienced as possessing a reality of their own, a reality that confronts the individual as an external and coercive fact" (Berger & Luckman, 1966 : 58, cited in Tolbert & Zucker, 1996 . The belief in the "exteriority" of social practices leads strategic actors to accept a practice as a stable component of the way the world is, even if it does not match a normative perception of the way the world should be (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Zucker, 1977) . While much of organizational theory has applied this argument to managerial actions, we propose that another fruitful application is to the study of stakeholder opposition to deviant organizational practices.
We develop two hypotheses specifically about the potential reaction of workers to deviant organizational behaviors that have strong adverse effects on employee welfare. Hirschman (1970) identifies two primary mechanisms by which workers are able to challenge organizational activity: exit and voice.
Based on the argument that normalization decreases manifest opposition to a deviant organizational practice, we first hypothesize that the more that organizations within a community use a deviant organizational practice that negatively impacts worker welfare, the less likely that workers in that community will exit (quit) a firm in response to the practice. Second, we hypothesize that the greater use within a community of such a deviant organizational practice, then the lower the probability that workers in that community will express voice (strike) against a firm that uses the practice. Our two hypotheses are as follows: 
WAGE ARREARS IN RUSSIA Background
Taking their starting point in the neoclassical economic model of wage adjustment, many previous studies have examined wage arrears in Russia as a "flexible" way for firms to reduce labor costs (Alfandari & Schaffer, 1996; Desai & Idson, 2000; Gimpelson, 1998; Layard & Richter, 1995; Lehmann, Wadsworth, & Acquisti, 1999 ; a critique of this approach can be found in Sabirianova, 2000 and 2002) . In the early 1990s, the pressure to cut labor costs in Russia was heavy due to the inherited situation of overstaffing, particularly in industrial enterprises, which, emerging from the constraints and supports of administrative planning, had experienced tremendous shocks to their product and factor markets. GDP had fallen by about 40 percent, and industrial production had been cut by over half in the early and mid-1990s (Goskomstat, 1998) .
Faced with this crisis, firms responded by reducing employment, hours of work, real wage rates, and employee benefits, as well as by delaying wages. An economic consequence of wage arrearsthe ability to adjust wage contracts flexibly under conditions of high uncertainty and difficult economic conditions -is portrayed as the primary causal explanation of why this practice grew so rapidly in post-communist Russia.
While the neo-classical economic model views firms as atomistic actors who choose practices based on their immediate economic benefits, a normalization model identifies the importance of local meaning and context in explaining the persistence of deviant organizational practices. This perspective is not necessarily inconsistent with a neoclassical explanation for why some organizations may initially adopt a new practice such as wage arrears, but instead adds a social dimension to understanding why such a deviant practice is able to spread and endure within a community.
A comparison of the widespread use of wage arrears in Russia with the practice of on-time payment in other countries illustrates the difference between a normalization of deviance perspective and the neo-classical argument. As Sabirianova (2000, 2002) note, wage arrears are not only much rarer in most economies (including most post-socialist countries), but also when they do appear, the circumstances tend to be quite special. For instance, they may appear in small start-up companies facing severe liquidity constraints, bankrupt firms about to be shut down, or occasional situations of fraud. For most firms under most circumstances, the choice of delaying wage payments is simply not an option. (March & Olsen, 1989) . What is a taken-for-granted organizational practice may or may not conform to what is written in formal law.
While a comparison of wage arrears in Russia to norms of on-time payment in other societies illustrates the important role of institutional context in explaining cross-national variation in organizational behavior, we focus in our analysis on variation in the use of wage arrears between communities within Russia. By looking at comparisons within Russia, we are able to control for explanations of wage arrears that stress national characteristics, such as the idiosyncrasies of Russian culture or the weakness of the Russian state. By using a measure of normalization based on the cumulative use of wage arrears within a Russian community, we are able to identify differences in local norms that are based on actual behavior rather than formal law.
Data
The firm-level data in this paper were collected to provide precise measures of wage arrears, growth, liquidity, labor, strikes, turnover and other variables at the firm level for the period from 1991 to 1998. 1 The data were collected in 1999 and 2000 as part of a larger study of Russian firms. The data from the responses to this questionnaire were also linked to other data sources (Goskomstat industrial and agricultural registries and balance sheets) to supplement and further check the provided information.
Sample
The sample of firms is based on all industrial and agricultural employers of the employee respondents to a nationwide household survey, the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). 2 The sampling for the RLMS involves regional stratification across 50 raions (counties) within 32 Russian oblasts (states or regions), with the probability of selection proportional to population (except for the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, which were taken as selfrepresenting). Household addresses are randomly selected for interviewing within the geographical sampling units. Employees were asked to provide detailed information on their employers, and in most cases they provided the name of the firm or sufficient information to enable an exact match to their workplace (e.g, "I work for the metallurgical plant over there.") Thus, conditional on the RLMS community stratification procedure and the information provided by respondents on their employers, the firms in our sample constitute a national probability sample of industrial employers.
3
The selection probability is proportional to employment size, which implies that our results pertain to the situation of an average worker in Russia rather than an average firm. If the sampling gave equal probability to all firms, the sample would be overwhelmingly dominated by very small firms, and the results would pertain to the situation for these employers only.
Unlike most surveys of firms, our procedure did not replace nonresponding firms with other observations, and interviewers expended great efforts to include every firm on their sample lists. As a result of this procedure, the response rate was high: 64% among industrial firms (522 firms) and 73% among agricultural firms (75 firms). The regional and sectoral employment shares are similar to those in the official statistics, as could be expected from a random sample with high response rates. Response rates did not differ between the large firms in the government registries of enterprises and smaller firms that do not appear in the registry, so there is no evidence of size-related bias.
In total, the sample of firms, conditioned on a non-missing wage arrears variable (since this is necessary at each step in the analysis), is 560 firms, of which 486 come from the industrial firm survey and 74 from the agricultural firm survey. Firms interviewed before early 2000 did not provide information on 1999, as their accounts were not yet ready. The agricultural firm survey also includes information only through 1998.
Variables
Firm Wage Arrears. An organizational practice can be measured either as an indicator (dummy) variable for whether an organization engages in the practice at all or as a continuous measure of the extent to which the organization uses the practice. We employ both measures in this paper. The standard measure of the amount of wage arrears in Russia -whether in individual-firm balance sheets, in official Russian statistics or the minds of workers -is the stock of wages that is overdue (Earle & Sabirianova, 2002) . The usual way managers express this stock is in terms of monthly wage bills (payrolls or total wage costs for the month). Thus, in our own interviews with managers, conducted when we were designing the data collection instrument, a common type of answer to a question about arrears would be "We're doing well, so we only owe one month," or "Now we have five months of arrears."
Our data contain this measure of the firm-level stock of wage arrears in monthly wage bills, as reported by a top manager in each year from 1991 to 1998. We label this variable Arrears (months). Using this information, we also construct a dummy variable for whether the firm had any wage arrears in a particular year, labeled Arrears (dummy). The data also contain wage arrears on the balance sheet, which we use to construct an alternative dummy variable.
4
Local Arrears. Measuring community norms requires an assumption about the relevant organizational field or geographic unit defining the community. We use the unit of analysis defined as the raion (county) as the boundaries of the communities around which we develop our property of independence holds in the RLMS, since the final drawing is random and therefore equal for all n 2 households. See Swafford (1997) for more information on the RLMS sampling procedure. 4 The results from the accounting data are very similar to those we received from the managerial reports, so we do not report them in the paper, but they are available on request.
hypotheses. Russian raions are distinct administrative units below the oblast (regional)
governments. In size, they are similar to U.S. counties, and studies have shown that the labor market tends to be highly local in Russia, as geographic mobility is difficult (see, e.g., Mitchneck & Plane, 1995) . Our data contain firms from 50 raions of Russia. We will use the terms "locality" and "community" interchangeably to refer to this unit of analysis.
Analogously to the measure of a practice at the organizational level, a community norm may be defined in terms of the frequency or intensity of the use of the practice. Theory provides little guidance on which measure is preferable, so we examine both. Our two measures of the community wage arrears norm correspond to the two measures of arrears at the organizational level: Local Arrears (months) represents the average stock of wage arrears among the sampled agricultural and industrial firms, and Local Arrears (share), measures the share (proportion) of organizations using wage arrears. In both cases, the variable refers to the firm's raion in the previous year.
Worker Quits (Q) and Strikes (S).
Quit rates (Q) for each year were calculated by dividing total voluntary separations by average employment for the corresponding year. These data were obtained from the survey with reference to annual employment reports to the Goskomstat (the "P-4 form" in recent years). The incidence of strikes (a dummy variable, S) was measured through survey questions to top managers on whether work protests had occurred at the firm, including not only conventional work stoppages but also in a few cases hunger strikes, demonstrations, slowdowns and other actions. The survey also asked for the main motivation for the protest, and it is interesting to note that more than 90 percent of the responses reported wage arrears as the cause; this variable is therefore very appropriate for our purposes.
Control Variables
As previously discussed, a neo-classical wage adjustment model has frequently been used to explain the growth of wage arrears in Russia. From this approach, firm-level economic pressures, particularly the need to cope with problems of liquidity and growth in Russia's difficult economic environment, are portrayed as the primary causal explanation of why wage arrears have diffused so widely in post-communist Russia. To control for this explanation of wage arrears, we collected multiple measures of firm growth and liquidity. One set of growth measures relates to performance of the firm in general: output growth, sales growth, patents, and profitability. The second set of measures relates more directly to labor market behavior: growth in employment, real wages, nominal wages, and the hiring rate. All these variables are represented with the notation G. Liquidity measures (L) include profitability (which could also be viewed as a performance measure), frozen bank account in response to nonpayment of debts (kartoteka), barter in payments for inputs and outputs, and overdue receivables and payables.
Changes in these variables are calculated for each year in which the data were collected.
We also include industry indicators to proxy both for demand conditions and for differences in technology that may increase the propensity of firms to use wage arrears and of workers to strike and quit (for instance, due to differences in skill specificity). We include a location code for whether a firm is located in a capital (national or regional), a non-capital city, or a non-city, the rationale being that workers' reactions to late wage payments may be influenced by their outside options in the local labor market. In general, the larger the urban area, the greater the number of outside options workers may be expected to have. Unionization is included because unions may resist arrears, although some observers believe that Russian unions have had little influence on labor market outcomes (e.g., Gimpelson & Lippoldt, 2001; Kapeliushnikov, 2001) . Fringe benefits may also affect worker behavior, particularly their tendency to quit (Layard & Richter, 1995) and strike, while the measure of initial training costs captures the firm's costs of adjustment in replacing workers who quit. 
Summary Statistics
so that Arrears it = wage arrears of firm i in year t, X it is the set of controls discussed with reference to Table 1 , Local Arrears it-1 is the lagged regional level of arrears, G it is a measure of firm growth and L it is a measure of firm liquidity. We estimated specifications with many possible combinations of G it and L it to assess the robustness of our results. The α t are year dummies, the β, γ, δ 1 , and δ 2 are parameters to be estimated, and the u it reflect the influence of unobserved factors on wage arrears. As discussed above, the dependent variable is measured in two alternative ways, Arrears (months) and Arrears (dummy). In the latter case, the model estimates the impact of a lagged change in the community norm on the probability of a firm engaging in the practice; it is a linear probability model (LPM).
The main variable of interest also has two measures, Local Arrears (months) and Local Arrears (share).
A first test of the multivariate model maintains the assumption of a zero conditional mean of the u it , estimating with pooled ordinary least squares (OLS). While this is a useful starting point, one potential problem with these results could arise if there is some unobservable wage arrears effect that is correlated with Local Arrears. Suppose, for example, that firms tend to cluster regionally, such that firms with a high unobserved "propensity to have arrears" tend to be found near each other. This propensity will be positively correlated with both Arrears and Local Arrears, imparting an upward bias to the estimated γ. A second type of model exploits our longitudinal data (multiple observations over time for each firm) to control for this correlated effect. We decompose the error term u it =α i + ε it , where α i reflects this propensity (and other unobserved fixed factors). We used a firm fixed effect (FE) estimator to implement this estimation. The fixed effects estimator controls for time-invariant community characteristics and for correlated unobservables among organizations within communities.
Since the FE model controls for fixed sources of heterogeneity in the data, such as initial conditions within a community, its estimates are based on changes in wage arrear levels over time rather than on absolute levels within a single year. The model therefore examines the deviation of a firm's average use of wage arrears in response to the lagged deviation from the average level in its community. The results therefore do not reflect an automatic statistical correlation between community and firm characteristics, but instead provide evidence of a firmlevel response to prior changes in community averages.
Worker Responses to Wage Arrears.
To test Hypotheses 2 and 3, we estimate the effect of firmlevel arrears and their interaction with average community arrears on worker responses through voice (incidence of strikes and protests, S) and exit (quit rate, Q). We specify the following equations: these models against the data. that a one-month increase in the average use of the practice in the community increase the probability that the firm will use wage arrears by 6 to 7 percent in the following year. The coefficients on Local Arrears (share) imply that a 0.5 increase in the proportion of firms using arrears implies a 24 to 38 percentage point increase in the probability of using the practice at all.
RESULTS

The Use of Wage Arrears
Results for the control variables with the Arrears (dummy) as dependent variable, shown in the Table 5 reports some representative results for the firm fixed effect specification from Table 3 using Local Arrears (months). We consider these alternative measures separately because they are highly correlated with one another. Most of these variables are statistically significant, but some of them only weakly so. This analysis implies that neoclassical considerations of firm growth and liquidity may be relevant for use of the wage arrears practice, but these are insufficient on their own to account for the practice.
By contrast, regardless of the specification, the effect of lagged local wage arrears remains large and highly statistically significant. The magnitude ranges from around .35 to .45, depending on the exact specification. 6 In general, the results for the variable of interest are highly robust, and indeed they do not appear to vary with firm characteristics.
Not only is the estimated impact of lagged Local Arrears positive, sizable in magnitude, and precisely estimated (statistically significant), it also accounts for a substantial proportion of the firm-level variation in Arrears. The R 2 s in Tables 3-5 
Worker Responses to Wage Arrears
Our final results concern the effects of normalization processes on worker responses through voice (strikes) and exit (quits). Table 6 presents the findings from this analysis.
Consistent with hypotheses 2 and 3, the results show that worker responses to arrears are strongly affected by the extent of arrears in their local environment. The results imply that workers do respond to larger arrears at their firms with higher strike probability and quit ratesbut only at low levels of arrears in the local community. An additional 3 months of Arrears is estimated to raise the probability of a strike by 5 percentage points and the quit rate by 3 to 4 percentage points, when Local Arrears (months) or Local Arrears (share) is close to zero. These magnitudes are very substantial relative to the mean values of these variables (5.5 percent for strikes, 19.8 percent for quits).
As Local Arrears rise, however, the negative coefficient on the interaction effect in each model shows that the worker responsiveness to Arrears declines rapidly. This basic result holds for both dependent variables (strikes and quits) and for both measures of Local Arrears. In the first column of results, for instance, the probability of a strike is estimated to fall by half when
Local Arrears (months) are in the 2-3 month range; the same is true for quits in the third column of results (the first quit rate column). At higher levels of Local Arrears (such as those in the late 1990s), workers hardly respond at all to increases in arrears at their own firms, apparently becoming passive in the face of larger arrears. ***INSERT TABLE 6 HERE*** These results are again robust to a wide variety of changes in the statistical specification of the estimating equations. Among a number of alternatives, we have investigated whether the extent to which community norms moderate worker responses is a function of union status and firm size. On the one hand, unions might serve to overcome the moderation of individual behavior by providing a broader view on the possibilities for resisting the wage arrears practice.
On the other hand, larger firms might be more likely to use the practice because they are larger players in the local community, helping to set local norms. In neither case, however, did we find any detectable pattern of increase or decrease in the moderation effect, which on the contrary appears to be uniform over these different types of firms. Overall, our findings strongly support the normalization hypotheses that the level of arrears in the community attenuates the exit and voice responses of workers to their own arrears.
DISCUSSION
Our analysis of a large survey of Russian agricultural and industrial firms, containing annual information from 1991 to 1998, provided strong support for our normalization hypotheses.
We first found that changes in the level of wage arrears in a local community influence the subsequent use of wage arrears by local organizations. This result is robust to controlling for a host of firm characteristics, including alternative measures of growth, performance and liquidity, and to including firm fixed effects that control for any constant, unobserved propensity of firms to use arrears that may be correlated with local arrears. Moreover, the results are robust to alternative definitions of arrears at both the firm and community levels.
Second, we found less, rather than more, opposition to firm-level wage arrears in the communities where they were the most prevalent. In communities with low arrears, a firm's quit rate and strike probability both tended to increase with the level of firm arrears. In areas with high arrears, however, these responses were strongly attenuated. Workers were less likely to oppose their own wage arrears in localities in which the practice was more widely used. The analysis again controls for a rich set of firm and worker characteristics, providing strong evidence that workers were not simply responding to their immediate experience of wage arrears in their own firms but also to the local context in which they worked.
Our analysis presents one of the first studies of normalization processes at a community level of analysis. A challenge to studying deviant behavior at this level is that comprehensive records are rarely kept about behavior that violates the law, making it difficult to measure normalization processes in actual business settings. If data are available, they usually come from judicial hearings and investigations that ex post label organizational activity as illegal or immoral (Baucus, & Near, 1991; Simpson, 1986 ). Yet, relying on formal hearings and prosecutions to collect data makes it difficult to analyze cases of normalized deviance. In these situations, it is often the relative inaction, rather than the action, of external stakeholders that defines the relevant institutional context of organizational behavior.
We have proposed that the cumulative adoption measure found in institutional research in organizational theory provides one approach to studying informal norms of deviant behavior without relying on measures of formal law or regulatory enforcement. A limitation of this approach is that it does not directly examine the individual decision-making processes that shape the aggregate responses observed in the data. These studies, like ours, infer decision-making processes by looking at collective patterns of behavior (Fligstein, 1985; Palmer, Jennings, & Zhou, 1993; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983) . Further advancement in the study of organizational deviance requires multiple research methodologies and designs to analyze the complex dynamics that lead to the persistence of deviant behavior within some communities.
One important avenue for research is to further analyze the role of stakeholders in supporting or challenging deviant organizational behavior. The issue of whose conception of legitimacy is operable at any particular time or place represents a central question in the study of organizational deviance. As in our case, what is legitimate for managers may not be legitimate for other social actors (Perrow, 1986) . Therefore, an examination of the role of managers in constructing their own definitions of legitimate behavior requires the question: legitimate for whom? (Hinings & Greenwood, 2002; Stryker, 2000) . We have addressed this question by including both managers and workers in our analysis, which represents a contribution to organization research that focuses solely on managerial beliefs and actions in studying the effects of local context on organizational practice. The influence of institutional processes on the behavior of organizational actors other than managers represents an important avenue for future study.
A limitation of our analysis into stakeholder responses is that we only looked at one type of potential challenger to deviance, workers, and that we examined only the first six years of the growth of a deviant practice. Researchers of organizational misconduct have identified a host of potential challengers to deviance, such as activists, non-governmental organizations, regulators, journalists, and multinational organizations (Ermann & Lundman, 2002; Palmer, 2008) . These different actors may intervene into deviant systems through different means and mobilize resistance at different times. Workers, for instance, may become instantly aware of a laborrelated deviant practice as they immediately feel its effects, while it may take regulators or activists a longer period to identify local norms that they wish to contest. There therefore may be threshold effects in the normalization process whereby the cumulative use of a deviant practice activates different types of responses over time. For instance, once the use of deviant practices reaches a large enough magnitude, the sheer scale of exposure may expose deviant practices to outside intervention that would be absent in the case of widespread but less contested practices.
Given the limited time frame of our analysis, we were unable to examine the possibilities of such delayed responses to widespread deviant behavior.
Anecdotal evidence on wage arrears following the time period of our sample suggests that resistance to wage arrears did strengthen over time, but that the organizational practice nevertheless persisted within the Russian environment. The strong devaluation of the ruble and rapid inflation following the Russian financial crisis in 1998 allowed managers to pay back arrears at highly discounted rates. Putin's administration, starting in 2000, also challenged wage arrears more forcibly than had his predecessor's, and may also have contributed to a further reduction in wage arrears in Russia. Gerber (2006 Gerber ( : 1819 remarks, however, that public opinion poll data demonstrate that wage arrears remained a critical factor in Russian economic life even after the August 1998 crash and the onset of Putin's presidency. In November 2000, 55% of workers responded that their employers did not consistently pay them their full wages on time.
By November 2001, this number fell to 42% of respondents reporting consistent wage arrears, still a relatively high proportion of workers within Russia. While wage arrears declined gradually over the next years, it is notable that wage arrears have once again strongly increased in response to the 2008 financial crisis: according to official statistics, the level of arrears on November 1, 2008, was 33 percent above the level one month earlier, and by December 1, the rise was nearly 150 percent (Goskomstat, 2008) . Clearly, although their use has ebbed and waned since the 1990s, wage arrears practices remain on the menu of strategic choices that firms actively consider in Russia.
When examining national trends in the use of wage arrears over time in Russia, it is important to note that our study examined normalization processes at a community level of analysis. While we found that wage arrears were strongly normalized in some Russian communities during the 1990s, we also found strong variation in the use of and response to wage arrears across locales. As previously noted, one factor that facilitates challenges to existing institutional arrangements is the degree to which alternative models to the status quo are visible and actively discussed (Misangyi et al., 2008) . Since alternative models and challenges still remained visible in Russia during the 1990s, wage arrears were never as normalized at a national level of analysis as within particular communities. Potential conflict between and within communities over the use of and responses to wage arrears represents an important topic for further study in Russia.
Another topic for future research is to explore the organizational strategies and structures that may be able to resist external pressures to engage in deviant behavior. In this study, we did not address the question of organizational responses to institutional pressures, as we deliberately controlled for firm-level variation in an attempt to examine institutional effects on managerial and worker behavior. However, the question of how firms respond to such pressures at the organizational level remains an important issue for further analysis. A normalization perspective suggests that managers working in communities with high rates of deviant behavior need to understand the local context in which deviant behavior occurs before attributing negative ethical attributes to individual actors. Individuals may come to believe that a deviant practice is a relatively fixed and immovable element of their local environment without necessarily normatively approving of it. In such contexts, dealing with issues of organizational integrity through ethical training sessions or case-by-case intervention may underestimate the strength of external pressures for deviance. Instead, organizations in these contexts may be better off seeking solutions to ethical dilemmas at a community level of analysis. DeGeorge (1993) suggests that firms in such situations should consider working with other private and public actors to attempt to seek collective solutions to common problems.
An important policy implication of the normalization literature for organizations seeking collective solutions to ethical problems, and for government officials and non-for-governmental organizations seeking to achieve similar goals, is the importance of understanding local norms and history. We noted in our study that many previous studies of wage arrears applied a neoclassical economic model of wage adjustment to the Russian context, assuming that a standard model developed in western markets could be applied with little adaptation abroad. In contrast,
we have suggested that such a standardized model does not take into account the way that local context shapes the boundaries of permissible organizational behavior within a community or society. In the absence of government intervention, economic outcomes beneficial to all community members do not naturally emerge through market forces. Instead, the normalization literature proposes that deviant organizational practices with strong negative consequence for many societal groups may become increasingly entrenched and difficult to change over time if allowed to proceed unchecked. In these situations, reform programs explicitly tailored to address the local beliefs and structures that facilitate systemic deviance, rather than programs modeled on a standard economic or policy template, are most likely to succeed. Relying on unfettered market forces, or on changes to formal law, is unlikely to be a sufficient strategy to significantly challenge the status quo of widespread deviant behavior (Misangyi et al., 2008) .
The normalization literature also identifies the need to develop comprehensive reform strategies that deal with the full complexities of systemic deviance. For instance, one factor in the spread of wage arrears in the Russian case was likely the relative lack of labor mobility across communities, which limited the opportunities of Russian workers to escape deviant organizational practices. A similar explanation can be used to explain why sweatshops often remain isolated within poor, immigrant communities in advanced industrial countries, since workers in these locales often have fewer options available to challenge managerial discretion (Rosen, 2002; Radin & Calkins, 2006 ).
Yet, the normalization literature cautions against a deterministic or single-variable approach to explaining the persistence of organizational deviance within a community. For instance, while some poor, immigrant communities may be characterized by sweatshops, others are not (Rosen, 2002; Radin & Calkins, 2006) . Similarly, while workers often remain passive toward management in difficult economic conditions, there are numerous examples that demonstrate that workers do mobilize in support of their own long-term interests even under the most adverse conditions (Edwards, 1979; Piven & Cloward, 1978) . Misangyi et al. (2008) argue that neither researchers nor policy makers should try to explain the emergence or persistence of systemic organizational deviance by only examining a single actor or mechanism. Successful challenges to normalization processes are those that address the multiple social actors, and the multiple mechanisms, that enable deviant behavior to become routinely practiced and accepted. Notes: Dependent variable = Arrears (months). Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level. All four specifications use firm fixed effects, the same set of control variables as in Table 3 , plus the additional growth and liquidity measures shown. Notes: Strike incidence=dummy for strike or protest. Quit rate=ratio of quits to average employment. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level. Year and industry dummies and intercept are included but not shown here. R 2 = R 2 -within for FE estimates.
